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ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact of unfavorable media coverage on the stock market prices of
major food companies, an issue of increasing importance to the food industry. The study fo-
cuses on the 16 April 1996 Oprah Winfrey Show, a popular television program that raised ques-
tions about the safety of the U.S. beef supply. The show resulted in considerable controversy,
and some cattle feeders blamed the show for a drop in cattle prices. The focus of this study is
on the impact of the program at other stages of the food system. We examined the stock returns
of two major beef packers and leading fast-food hamburger restaurants during the days imme-
diately following the show. Standard event study methods were used to determine the normal
behavior of stock returns and to identify abnormal stock returns that could be attributed to the
program. Our results suggest that the program did have a negative and statistically significant
impact on the stock returns of a portfolio of fast-food companies. One of the two beef packers
also experienced adverse stock price reactions to the television program. The paper concludes
with recommendations and avenues for further research.
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INTRODUCTION
An important issue facing the food industry is the
impact of major media sources on consumer perceptions
of the safety and health attributes of food products. One
highly publicized incident occurred on the 16 April 1996
Oprah Winfrey Show. This program featured a discussion
on consumer safety. One of the three segments of this
discussion focused on “mad cow disease” and the extent
to which it poses a threat to the American consumer.
Statements made by Winfrey’s guests questioned the
safety of including animal byproducts as ingredients in
feed rations and raised concern that mad cow disease
poses a potential danger in the United States. At one
point in the program, Winfrey stated, “It has just stopped
me cold from eating another burger,” (Hayenga, 1998).
Some cattlemen’s organizations were not happy with
Winfrey’s show and blamed it for a substantial drop in
the cash price for fed cattle that occurred during the fol-
lowing weeks. Furthermore, two large Texas cattle feed-
ers and other businesses filed charges under product defa-
mation laws, alleging that the show made false statements
that led to lower prices.
Hayenga (1998) provided an outline of the eco-
nomic issues and analysis that were presented during
the lawsuit. One economist who testified at the trial de-
veloped a model to analyze Texas cattle price behavior.
He used a regression method to estimate a cattle price
model for the Texas-Oklahoma market area. This model
accounted for supply-and-demand factors that could po-
tentially influence price during the specified period sur-
rounding the program. On the basis of the estimated
model, the economist concluded that beef prices were in-
fluenced by forces outside of the typical supply-and-de-
mand factors. This implied that the price drop could have
been caused by Winfrey’s show, but he never directly
stated this. Other economists argued that there are many
factors influencing price behavior at a given point in time
and that it is almost impossible to trace the given price
drop to a specific event, for example, Winfrey’s show.
This case was closed with the decision that there was
not enough evidence to connect the Oprah Winfrey Show
to the drop in cash cattle prices.
In this paper, our major objective was to provide
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more insight into how major media forces affect the food
and agriculture industry. Specifically, we used daily stock
market data to examine the impact of a demand-shap-
ing force, i.e., a television program, on stock price re-
turns of beef packers and retailers. We looked at major
beef packers (IBP and ConAgra) and some of the leading
fast-food hamburger restaurants that are publicly traded
in the United States. Our analysis was aimed at deter-
mining whether abnormal stock returns resulted from
the 16 April television program. Our models were based
on the standard event study methodology. This method-
ology uses past company behavior to develop forecasts
of stock returns during the days surrounding an event of
interest. The method enabled us to determine whether ab-
normal stock returns resulted from the television program.
Event study methods have been used extensively
in finance literature and are widely used as an accurate
indicator of stock market behavior. Binder (1998) pro-
vides a complete literature review of event study meth-
ods. These methods have been used to examine the im-
pact of unfavorable product information, such as the
impact of the 1982 Tylenol poisoning incident (Mitchell,
1989) and bank failures (Aharony and Swary, 1996).
They have also been used to examine the effects of policy
or regulations on affected companies (Lamdin, 1999,
Edelman and Baker, 1996).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Daily stock market prices were obtained by the
Center of Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. These data reflect all securities traded
on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Ex-
change, and the NASDAQ. This allowed us to obtain the
necessary information on the two major publicly traded
beef packers, IBP and ConAgra, and the parent compa-
nies of five leading hamburger restaurants, McDonald’s,
Wendy’s, Sonic, Foodmaker, and CKE enterprises.
Foodmaker owns the Jack-in-the-Box chain, and CKE
enterprises own Hardee’s and Carl’s Jr. chains. One ma-
jor restaurant, Burger King, was not included in the analy-
sis because it is a subsidiary of a large, foreign conglom-
erate for which we do not have data in the CRSP files. In
total, the five fast-food companies studied account for
at least 60% of the fast-food hamburger market
(Horovitz, 1999).
The event study methods we used have been out-
lined by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). We first
looked at the behavior of the stock prices during the
estimation period, a period of time before the television
program. The estimation period reflects a period of time
not affected by the event in question and is used to esti-
mate a model of normal stock performance. We then
used our estimated model to forecast stock returns for
the period surrounding the time the event took place;
we defined this period as the event period. Finally, we
compared the projected or normal stock returns during
the event period with the stock returns that were actu-
ally observed. The difference between these normal and
observed returns is defined as abnormal returns due to
the event. We then conducted hypothesis tests to deter-
mine whether the estimated abnormal returns were sta-
tistically significant.




 is the stock return on day t and p
t
 is the stock
price on day t. The returns measure provided in the CRSP
data files also incorporates dividends or cash adjustments
that may have an impact on stock prices.
The market model that was used to estimate nor-
mal performance was estimated over the estimation pe-
riod. This model is specified as follows.
where α and β are parameters to be estimated, R
mt
 is the
return on market index, and εt is an error term. In this
study, we used the CRSP value weighted return for the
measure of R
mt
. The value-weighted return reflects the
performance of a weighted average portfolio of all stocks
traded on the three major U.S. exchanges. The total value
of shares outstanding is used as the weights. The results
presented in the next section would not be substantially
different if other common market indexes, such as the
return on Standard & Poor’s 500 composite index, were
used in place of the CRSP value weighted return mea-
sure. We used t to index the trading days and defined
day t = 0 as 16 April 1996, the day of the television
program. The market model in equation 2 was esti-
mated over days t = –125 to t = –5. This was our esti-
mation period.
The next step was to calculate abnormal returns
during the event period. The event period consisted of
26 days from t = –5 to t = 20. Abnormal returns at each
day in the event period were calculated as follows.
Rt = a + b Rmt + e t [Eq. 2]
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ing somewhat better than average in the market. The t
statistics for the slope coefficients indicated significance
at the 1% level, with the exception of IBP, which was
marginally significant at the 10% level. We rejected the
null hypothesis H
O
: β = 0, in favor of the alternative,
H
A
: β = 0. All intercepts reported in this table are very
close to zero. This is expected because if the market
average approaches zero, the firm’s returns should also
be close to zero.
Looking at the cumulative abnormal returns tables,
ConAgra was obviously affected more drastically (Table
2). The market responded instantaneously to the new
information provided by Winfrey’s program on the day
of the show and for about a month of trading afterwards.
The t statistics indicated that cumulative abnormal re-
turns were significantly negative, mostly at the 5% level
during days immediately following Winfrey’s show and
were significant at the 10% level on the later days. This
provides enough evidence that ConAgra was strongly af-
fected by Winfrey’s show. On the contrary, this was not
true for IBP, for which there was not sufficient evidence
provided by our model to indicate an effect of Winfrey’s
show on stock returns. According to the t statistics, we
failed to reject the null hypothesis that cumulative ab-
normal returns were greater than or equal to zero. There
were only two exceptions to this; however, these reflect
aggregations before Winfrey’s show and thus are unlikely
to have been caused by the program.
The value weighted fast-food portfolio (VWFFP)
included McDonald’s, Wendy’s, Sonic, Jack-in-the-Box,
Hardee’s, and Carl’s Jr. From these, Jack-in-the-Box,
Hardee’s, and Carl’s Jr. are subsidiaries of a larger parent
corporation. This is important because even if Winfrey’s
show had affected the Jack-in-the-Box chain, for example,
it would not necessarily have had a drastic impact on
Table 1. Regression results from the estimation period.z
ConAgra IBP Fast-food portfolio
Intercept –0.0001 –0.0010 0.0002
(–0.15) (–0.43) (0.17)
Market Return 0.7905 0.6363 1.1436
(slope) (5.59) (1.81) (5.89)
R2 0.2082 0.0268 0.2255
F test statistic 31.29 3.28 34.66
N 120 120 120
z t-test statistics for the parameter estimates are in parentheses.
where a and b are the ordinary least squares estimates of
α and β.
Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated by:
where AR is a 1 x 26 vector of the AR
t
 as calculated in
equation 3; τ1,τ2 = [–5,20] where τ1 ≤ τ2. We defined kÕ
as a 26 x 1 vector with the value of 1 in positions be-




and a value of 0 elsewhere.
The prime symbol is the transpose operator. Equiva-
lently, [Eq. 4] can be expressed as follows:
The variance of AR
t
 is calculated as follows:
where V is the 26 x 26 forecast variance matrix based on
the estimated models specified in [Eq. 2].
We conducted the following hypothesis test:
This is a one-tailed test. The alternative hypothesis is
that the Winfrey show would have only a negative im-
pact on stock returns.
RESULTS
The regression result are reported in Table 1. As
shown, the R2 value is not high, especially in the model
for IBP. However, this not atypical for event studies. The
F statistics, F
(2, 118)
, are used to test the null hypothesis
that R2 = 0, i.e., no variance was explained by the model.
The F statistics are large enough to indicate significance
in all three models. However, the test for the IBP model
is marginally significant at the 10% level. Both ConAgra’s
and IBP’s slope terms are less than 1, indicating that these
companies did not perform as well as the market portfo-
lio. On the other hand, the slope coefficient for the fast
food portfolio indicates that these companies were do-
ARt = Rt – a – bRmt [Eq. 3]
CAR(t 1,t 2) = k' • AR
[Eq. 4]
CAR(t 1,t 2) =      ARtS
t 2
t = t 1
[Eq. 5]s2(t 1,t 2) = k'Vk
HO: CAR(t 1,t 2) ‡  0
HA: CAR(t 1,t 2) < 0
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Fig. 1. Cumulative abnormal returns by event day.
Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns for ConAgra.z
Ending
period
(τ2) Beginning period (τ1)
–5 –3 –1 0
–5 0.01307 – – –
(1.26854)
–4 0.01573 – – –
(1.06678)
–3 0.00779 –0.00794 – –
(0.42810) (–0.76868)
–2 0.00769 –0.00804 – –
(0.36777) (–0.54947)
–1 0.00149 –0.01424 –0.00621 –
(0.06346) (–0.79024) (–0.59976)
  0 –0.02679 –0.04251 –0.03448 –0.02827
(–1.04076) (–2.03168) c (–2.34353) c (–2.74079) c
  1 –0.03867 –0.0544 –0.04636 –0.04015
(–1.38491) b (–2.32218) c (–2.57523) c (–2.74568) c
  2 –0.02314 –0.03887 –0.03083 –0.02462
(–0.77251) (–1.50730) b (–1.47554) b (–1.36906) b
  3 –0.02802 –0.04375 –0.03571 –0.02951
(–0.87865) (–1.56432) b (–1.52244) b (–1.41475) b
  4 –0.02628 –0.04201 –0.03397 –0.02777
(–0.77869) (–1.39761) b (–1.31460) b (–1.18466)
  5 –0.04645 –0.06218 –0.05414 –0.04793
(–1.30643) b (–1.93951) c (–1.92827) c (–1.85657) c
10 –0.08384 –0.09957 –0.09154 –0.08533
(–1.91894) c (–2.44590) c (–2.44612) c (–2.39551) c
15 –0.06182 –0.07754 –0.06951 –0.0633
(–1.21373) (–1.61251) b (–1.53915) b (–1.45000) b
20 –0.07179 –0.08752 –0.07949 –0.07328
(–1.24327) (–1.58373) b (–1.51252) b (–1.43449) b
z Student’s t statistics are in parenthesis.
b indicates significance at the 10% level (one-tailed test).
c indicates significance at the 5% level (one-tailed test).





) Beginning period (τ
1
)
–5 –3 –1 0
–5 –0.01813 – – –
(–0.70792)
–4 –0.03536 – – –
(–0.96429)
–3 –0.04137 –0.00602 – –
(–0.91475) (–0.23418)
–2 –0.01946 0.01589 – –
(–0.37414) (0.43704)
–1 –0.05402 –0.01866 –0.03455 –
(–0.92779) (–0.41633) (–1.34268) b
  0 –0.06665 –0.0313 –0.04719 –0.01264
(–1.04139) (–0.60142) (–1.28985) b (–0.49262)
  1 –0.07328 –0.03793 –0.05382 –0.01927
(–1.05543) (–0.65109) (–1.20222) (–0.52980)
  2 –0.04853 –0.01317 –0.02907 0.00549
(–0.65149) (–0.20542) (–0.55938) (0.12269)
  3 –0.04904 –0.01369 –0.02958 0.00497
(–0.61840) (–0.19681) (–0.50710) (0.09586)
  4 –0.03096 0.0044 –0.0115 0.02306
(–0.36884) (0.05882) (–0.17889) (0.39556)
  5 0.00706 0.04242 0.02652 0.06108
(0.07986) (0.53205) (0.37984) (0.95123)
10 0.05592 0.09128 0.07538 0.10994
(0.51468) (0.90162) (0.81006) (1.24108)
15 0.02557 0.06093 0.04503 0.07958
(0.20188) (0.50945) (0.40097) (0.73306)
20 0.06017 0.09552 0.07963 0.11418
(0.41899) (0.69507) (0.60931) (0.89882)
z Student’s t statistics are in parenthesis.
y b indicates significance at the 10% level (one-tailed test).
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the stock return of Foodmaker, the parent enterprise that
owns the chain. Because of space limitations, specific
results are not reported by company. However, among
the rest of these six fast-food restaurants, McDonald’s
stock returns were most adversely affected by the show.
It should be mentioned here that McDonald’s repre-
sents about 43% of the fast-food restaurant market
(Horovitz, 1999).
A graphical representation of cumulative abnormal
returns by event day are presented in Fig. 1. This figure
indicates that for VWFFP and ConAgra, both of which
were significantly affected by Winfrey’s show, stock re-
turn prices dropped and did not recover for at least 20
trading days after the show.
DISCUSSION
As shown by the results presented, the media can
drastically impact stock returns by causing a micro-cri-
sis, in a sense, when unfavorable product information is
supplied to the stock market. The stock market has the
ability to adjust to any new information so fast, that of-
ten damage can be done even if the information is inac-
curate.
One puzzle raised by these results is that IBP, un-
like what we expected, was not significantly affected by
Winfrey’s show. On the contrary, the VWFFP and
ConAgra were significantly affected. Focusing on the two
larger beef packers, IBP and ConAgra, it is really inter-
esting to observe that given the same information their
stock behaved in a contradictory manner. There are sev-
eral possibilities that could explain this phenomenon.
First, the size and trading volume of each company is a
major factor in the firm’s responsiveness. We would ex-
pect a larger company, established in a given industry to
be affected more, than a smaller more controlled com-
pany. Another indicator explaining these results may be
the degree of diversification of each company. For ex-
ample, a part of ConAgra’s business is their feed-
producing business and the television program raised
concerns over feed ingredients used in cattle rations. Fi-
nally, the established communication networks of the
company with its stockholders can be very important
when new and adverse information enters the market.
The above are only some possibilities and require fur-
ther investigation.
Overall, the case studied here shows that veggie
libel laws may not be very effective in ensuring produc-
ers against losses resulting from unfavorable media at-
tention. This study raises another important implication
of these laws, that negative publicity can have a spillover
effect on food processors and marketers, who even if they
have a valid case, may be unable to proceed with claims
through the legal system. However, there are ways for
the food industry to assure some protection from such
exogenous forces. For example, we think the food in-
dustry should be more proactive in communicating and
educating the public on emerging heath concerns, e.g.,
mad cow disease. Another approach can be for a com-
pany to form better partnerships with third parties, such
Table 4. Cumulative abnormal returns for fast-food portfolio.z
Ending
period
(τ2) Beginning period (τ1)
–5 –3 –1 0
–5 –0.01072 – – –
(–0.75689)
–4 –0.00007 – – –
(–0.00330)
–3 –0.01077 –0.01071 – –
(–0.43096) (–0.75388)
–2 0.01642 0.01649 – –
(0.57124) (0.82033)
–1 0.01062 0.01069 –0.0058 –
(0.32999) (0.43134) (–0.40806)
  0 0.00883 0.0089 –0.00759 –0.00179
(0.24968) (0.30941) (–0.37536) (–0.12598)
  1 –0.01691 –0.01684 –0.03333 –0.02753
(–0.44046) (–0.52293) (–1.34683) b (–1.36919) b
  2 –0.02643 –0.02636 –0.04285 –0.03705
(–0.64181) (–0.74364) (–1.49186) b (–1.49832) b
  3 –0.03414 –0.03407 –0.05057 –0.04476
(–0.77879) (–0.88632) (–1.56810) b (–1.56122) b
  4 –0.02133 –0.02127 –0.03776 –0.03195
(–0.45979) (–0.51466) (–1.06281) (–0.99167)
  5 –0.03498 –0.03492 –0.05141 –0.0456
(–0.71577) (–0.79231) (–1.33190) b (–1.28487)
10 –0.02977 –0.0297 –0.04619 –0.04039
(–0.49558) (–0.53070) (–0.89793) (–0.82476)
15 –0.0224 –0.02234 –0.03883 –0.03302
(–0.32001) (–0.33790) (–0.62547) (–0.55029)
20 –0.05811 –0.05805 –0.07454 –0.06873
(–0.73208) (–0.76409) (–1.03180) (–0.97879)
z Student’s t statistics are in parenthesis.
b indicates significance at the 10% level (one-tailed test).
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as governmental agencies or universities, that can pro-
vide credibility to product benefit claims.
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